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Ensuring access to a truly ‘European’ energy grid for every consumer and supplier in the European 
Union is a core objective of the single market project. From the first wave of liberalization directives 
up until the ‘draft’ framework guidelines of September 2010 on capacity allocation and congestion 
management being prepared by ERGEG on behalf of the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER), the objective of the access regime in both sector is similar: to creating capacity to 
compete. The objective of this paper is to review and compare from a legal point of view the evolution 
of the EU access regime in the electricity and gas sectors. We find strong similarities for two 
otherwise very different sectors, as well as an influence of the electricity regime on the gas regime. 
The sector-specific regulatory regime, supported by the use of competition law, organises a market 
design in both sectors based as much as possible on short-term capacity allocation with a liquid 
secondary trading platforms. The imposition of UIOLI mechanisms and an increased focus on 
firmness of capacity is certainly the way forward but implementation still is an issue. The right 
portfolio of capacity durations that are to be proposed by TSOs also remains an open question. The 
specific features of these two commodities result however in slightly different results in practice. In 
electricity, the development of market coupling initiatives creates new regulatory challenges but price 
convergence is now in sight. In gas, the progress has been slower and efficiently functioning spot 
markets are yet to emerge. 
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Ensuring access to a truly ‘European’ grid for every consumer and supplier in the European Union is a 
key objective of the single market project since the beginning of liberalization. Competitive reforms in 
Europe were based on the fundamental insight that the gains from competitive energy trade would 
increase with the size of the market. Ensuring access creates a threat of competitive entry and thus 
constrains dominant operators to price outputs nearer competitive levels, even when new imports do 
not in fact occur.
2 Moreover, by providing links between otherwise isolated areas, it not only reduces 
prices but also contributes to security of supply. However, unavailable cross-border capacity, different 
market designs or lengthy and discriminatory access procedures still continue to hamper market 
integration despite the apparent efforts of Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and national 
regulators towards harmonization. 
A key problem of today’s access regimes is obviously the management of contractual congestion 
on cross-border interconnection. They exist both in electricity and gas. Contractual congestions occur 
when existing physical capacities offered by the TSOs are fully contracted, and are sometimes then 
under-used, which does not maximize the use of the existing physical capacity. Contractual 
congestions thus create a problem of capacity allocation and congestion management (CACM). As a 
result, EU energy infrastructures do not allow for any real competition among the former incumbents 
or new players and prices in neighbouring markets only converge slowly. 
Devising an efficient and non-discriminatory third-party access (TPA) regime, both to national 
networks and interconnection as well as transit pipelines for gas, has therefore been a core objective of 
the EU regulatory regime from the very beginning. Failure of the sector-specific regulatory framework 
on this issue has also more often than not been superseded by the use of competition law. Despite all 
these efforts, the access regime still remains a core preoccupation of national regulators and the 
Commission. Only one proof of this is that among the very first ‘draft’ framework guidelines being 
prepared by ERGEG on behalf of the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER); 
two of the guidelines address CACM in both electricity and gas. 
The objective of this chapter is to review and compare the evolution of the access regime in both 
electricity and gas. We will see strong similarities for two otherwise very different sectors, as well as 
an influence of the electricity regime on the gas regime. We will also see that interactions between 
access regimes at national and cross-border levels are very different in both sectors. This chapter will 
review both access regimes in turn before drawing some concluding remarks.  
1. In Search of a Suitable Market Design for CACM on Interconnection: The Main 
Challenge for Access Regimes in Electricity 
As opposed to the gas sector, the link between TPA regimes to national networks and interconnection 
is somewhat limited in electricity. Obtaining access to interconnections indeed most often creates a 
parallel right to access national networks on both sides of the line, which facilitates cross-border trade. 
At the national level, ensuring non-discriminatory TPA for internal transactions remains an enduring 
problem leading to numerous regulatory decisions and subsequent appeals in several Member States. 
The management of national congestions by TSOs might sometimes also have an effect on cross-
                                                      
1  This paper will be published in B. DELVAUX, M. HUNT and K. TALUS (eds.), EU energy law and policy issues 
(Brussels: Euroconfidentiel 2011). 
2  S. BORENSTEIN, J. BUSHNELL and S. STOFT, ‘The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated 
Electricity Market’, 31(2) RAND Journal of Economics (2000), p. 294-325. Adrien de Hauteclocque and Kim Talus 
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border trade.
3 This is however more a problem of enforcement, whereas the problem of 
interconnection is still a long-lasting problem of market design, recently leading to several new 
initiatives. The objective of this first part is therefore to review and discuss the evolution of the EU 
access regime for electricity network, with an extensive focus on interconnection and on the recent 
draft framework guidelines of September 2010.  
A. Sector-Specific Regulation and TPA to National Networks 
In the early 1990s, Member States’ opposition to TPA (except in the UK) led the Commission to draft 
a directive on TPA under Art 86(3) EC, which is the EC Treaty article used for the liberalization of 
telecommunications. However, both the Member States and the European Parliament opposed this 
initiative and the Commission abandoned the text in October 1991. Following a proposition from 
France, the Council asked the Commission to examine the possible co-existence of TPA with the 
single buyer model. After five years of intense negotiation, the European Parliament, and then the 
Council in 25 July 1996, accepted a compromise.
4  
The modalities of the organization of TPA were at the centre of all conflicts during the negotiations 
leading to the first directive. To reach a consensus, the directive introduced three alternatives: 
negotiated TPA, regulated TPA and single buyer. These systems could be combined and had to 
similarly ensure non-discrimination and transparency (Art 16). These systems were in principle to 
‘lead to equivalent economic results and hence to a directly comparable level of opening-up of 
markets and to a directly comparable degree of access to electricity markets’ (Art 3(1)). In the 
negotiated TPA system, supply and network access transactions are de-coupled. Eligible market 
players must contract for supply and then negotiate access with the TSO (Art 17(1)). This system 
could also apply for access to the distribution network (Art 17(2)). To facilitate negotiations, TSOs 
and distribution system operators (DSOs) had to publish indicative access tariffs based on the average 
prices charged in the previous year (Art 17(3)). In the regulated TPA system, access tariffs had to be 
fixed by the relevant national authorities.
5  
In the single buyer system, the producer and the eligible customer contracted on a certain volume, 
then the single buyer bought the electricity from the producer at the price agreed between them minus 
the cost of transport and distribution due to be published pursuant to Art 18(1)(i). The electricity was 
then resold to the buyer at the price primarily agreed with the producer. In the case where the single 
buyer did not have a duty to buy, negotiated or regulated TPA applied. The single buyer model raised 
important problems of transparency and accounting unbundling, and there were often two single 
buyers in practice, one for transport and one for distribution. Overall, the systems of TPA and single 
buyer were not so different in practice. France, which had rejected the former during the negotiations, 
finally implemented a regulated TPA system. This is also why the single buyer system was not 
retained in the first gas directive and subsequently in the second electricity directive.  
In the second directive, the negotiated TPA and single buyer models were cancelled, mainly 
because of a structural lack of transparency. We note that the new Directive 2009/72/EC does not 
bring any novelty to TPA as compared to the second directive. Art 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC 
states that: ‘Member States shall ensure the implementation of a system of third party access to the 
                                                      
3  This has been shown by the recent Svenska Kraftnat case where the national Swedish TSO probably curtailed the 
available capacity on the Sweden-Denmark interconnection to alleviate internal congestion, thereby impairing single 
market integration.  
4  We note that the principle of TPA is only one dimension of the access regime. The market design for transport activities, 
aiming to set the right incentives for TSOs through unbundling and the organization of sector-specific regulators in 
charge of over-viewing access must also be highlighted.  
5  For a case study, see J-M. Glachant, U. Dubois and Y. Perez, ‘Deregulating With No Regulator: Is the German Electricity 
Transmission Regime Institutionally Correct?’, 36(5) Energy Policy (2008), p. 1600-1610. Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas Networks 
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transmission and distribution systems based on published tariffs, applicable to all eligible customers 
and applied objectively and without discrimination between system users. Member States shall ensure 
that these tariffs, or the methodologies underlying their calculation, are approved prior to their entry 
into force in accordance with Article 23 and that these tariffs, and the methodologies — where only 
methodologies are approved — are published prior to their entry into force’. Three main reasons for 
refusal were included in the legislation. First is the lack of capacity. In this case, any refusal must be 
justified and TSOs/DSOs must provide relevant information on measures that would be necessary to 
reinforce the network. Second are public service obligations imposed by Member States within the 
meaning of Art 106(2) TFEU (Art 2(14)). Third is force majeure, referred to as ‘sudden crises’ in the 
directives (Art 42). Finally, the directives include provisions on tariff methodologies and transparency 
as excessive tariffs could de facto lead to discriminatory exclusion of the competitors of the vertically-
integrated utilities.  
Overall, the access regime to national network in electricity has been strengthened over time and 
lies on three pillars which have been developed in the three packages: a non-discriminatory access 
regime, strong regulators to overview it and unbundled TSOs. Certain problems however remain: the 
strict definition of possible objective justifications when TSOs refuse access, the quality of regulatory 
decisions and the expediency of appeal processes, and the concrete implementation by TSOs of 
priority access to renewable energy into the grid.
6  
B. Access to Electricity Interconnections: The Early Days 
It is interesting to see that as early as the beginning of the 1990s, addressing the functioning of 
interconnection has been a core objective of the Union and the Commission. We were however still far 
from addressing the market design of CACM. It was more a preliminary period with two major 
objectives: introducing principles of non-discrimination and transparency, and most importantly 
freeing interconnection from long-term priority access contracts signed before liberalization.  
1. The Transit Directive: A Preliminary Step 
Cross-border exchanges of electricity in the European Union started before any public authority at the 
Union or Member State level started to address the issue. Incumbent operators spontaneously started 
to exchange electricity mainly for technical and security-of-supply reasons and thus started to develop 
interconnections. Incumbent electricity operators started early to set up associations to facilitate cross-
border exchanges with a view to ensuring security of supply and limiting unnecessary investments in 
the network. These associations were mainly regional in scope. Prior to liberalization, interconnections 
had therefore primarily a solidarity purpose.  
Following the Single European Act of 1986, Energy Commissioner Mosar invited Member States 
to engage in single market integration, an orientation which was approved by European energy 
ministers at the Council of 2 June 1987. However, no legally binding act was enacted at the Union 
level before the Transit Directive.
7 The Transit Directive can be considered as a preliminary step. It 
was adopted on the 29 October 1990 under the co-decision procedure. The Transit Directive restated 
that increasing the size of electricity markets will allow for a better use of production and transmission 
capacities. The directive also stated that cross-border interconnections are important for social 
cohesion and a balanced development of the European Union. Lastly, the directive recalled the 
                                                      
6  On priority access, see the material presented at the workshop of the Florence School of Regulation on this issue: 
http://www.florence-
school.eu/portal/page/portal/FSR_HOME/ENERGY/Policy_Events/Workshops/2010/EU_Energy_Law_Policy  
7  Directive 90/547/EC of 29 October 1990 on the transit of electricity through transmission grids, O.J. 13.11.1990, L 
313/30. Adrien de Hauteclocque and Kim Talus 
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importance of interconnections for security of supply. In practice, however, it was long on generalities 
and short on concrete regulatory actions.  
Some duties were nonetheless imposed on Member States and national TSOs. In particular, TSOs 
had a legal duty to negotiate access without discriminating between access seekers. In case a 
satisfactory solution could not be found, the conflict had to be referred to the Commission and national 
authorities, and an arbitration procedure could be set up. Member States were also to notify the 
Commission of any existing transit contract (Art 2(3)). Overall, the Transit Directive aimed more to 
set up the conditions for the emergence of a competitive market than to truly create it. The Transit 
Directive was subsequently abrogated by the second liberalization Directive of 2003 (Art 29) and 
replaced by Regulation 1228/2003.  
2. The Commission and Export/Import Monopolies: The Beginning of a ‘Litigation’ Approach 
The Commission has early on taken a litigation strategy to start opening European electricity markets 
to competition. The recent line of access cases analysed in part 2 of this chapter are nothing new in 
this regard. As expressed in the Commission White Paper of 1995,
8 European energy policy mainly 
lies in the direct application of the EC Treaty and aims, among other objectives, to enable the creation 
of a true single market for goods and services. However, the application of free movement and 
competition rules to electricity firms long appeared impossible due to the exclusive and special rights 
they enjoyed in most Member States.
9 In view of the long negotiations on the first liberalization 
directive and the relative inertia of several Member States, the Commission nonetheless tried to use 
these provisions to accelerate opening. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was asked to rule on the 
applicability of free movement and competition rules to electricity for the first time in the early 1980s. 
The first objective of the Commission was to remove the exclusive legal rights to supply, which 
appeared to contradict competition rules and most importantly the free movement of goods.  
The Commission started by leveraging on third-party complaints against import and export 
monopolies. The first of these decisions by the Commission was Ijsselcentrale,
10 where the 
Commission attacked the import and export monopoly of SEP, a cooperative regrouping the four main 
Dutch electricity producers holding the transmission assets. The Commission judged that the 
cooperative constituted a restrictive agreement, and thus unduly infringed Art 85 EC (new Art 101 
TFEU), and that the application of competition rules did not preclude SEP fulfilling its public services 
obligation, hence excluding exemption under Art 90(2) EC (new Art 106(2) TFEU). This decision was 
much criticized by electricity operators as it occurred in the middle of the negotiations for the first 
liberalization directive. 
By attacking only one firm at a time, the Commission could not realistically reach its objectives in 
a foreseeable time frame. A few months later, the European Commission thus addressed a letter 
questioning national legislation on import and export monopolies to nine Member States (Denmark, 
Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands on electricity; and Belgium, Portugal, France and 
Denmark on gas). Following the receipt of unsatisfactory answers, the European Commission decided 
to attack these restrictions in five Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France and Portugal) 
before the ECJ under Art 30, 34 and 37 EC (new Art 34, 35 and 37 TFEU). The Commission was 
explicitly supported by the UK which had opened its market as early as 1989 under the Electricity Act 
(1989). The ECJ recognized the discrimination, which de facto did not require further examination 
under Art 30 and 34 EC. However, the ECJ deemed that the Commission did not sufficiently ground 
the fact that the conditions to benefit from exemption under Art 86(2) EC were not fulfilled and none 
                                                      
8  European Commission White Paper, An Energy Policy for the European Union, COM(95) 682 final of 13.12.1995. 
9  The situation was further complicated by the perceived strategic importance of the energy sector and the links between 
governments and the energy sector. The same factors still play a role in today’s energy policies.  
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of the Member States were condemned. After export/import monopolies, the Commission decided to 
address the problem of long-term priority access rights linked to the long-term contracts signed before 
liberalization between incumbents.  
3. Freeing Interconnections from Long-term Priority Access Rights  
Given contractual congestions on most EU borders, granting such rights for a substantial amount of 
the capacity of the interconnector and for a long period could amount to a monopolization of an 
essential facility and hence an abuse of a dominant position, depending on the market position of the 
right holder. 
Up until 2006, about 40% of all interconnector capacities are still granted in the form of long-term 
priority access rights to the former incumbents (often called ‘grandfathering’ rights) to fulfil their 
long-term obligations of supply signed before liberalization, although the situation is slowly 
improving.
11 As concerns already existing and amortized interconnectors owned by dominant firms 
(the old merchant lines), the Commission intervened on several occasions to ensure that long-term 
priority access rights do not block market access for competing suppliers.
12 The Commission indeed 
systemically deemed long-term capacity reservations signed before liberalization to be abuse of a 
dominant position under the antitrust rules and required that 100% of capacities be freed up (UK-
French submarine interconnector,
13 Skagerrak cable and Denmark-Germany interconnectors
14 
following the merger VEBA/VIAG
15). For the UK-French submarine interconnector, 100% of the 
capacity then had to be auctioned on the basis of 3 years bilateral contracts (1500MW divided in 
50MW blocks) and concurrently annual (50MW in 1MW blocks) and daily (150MW in 1MW blocks) 
auctions. 
The relative but general antitrust tolerance towards risky infrastructure investment
16 seems 
impossible to justify objectively for existing and amortized infrastructure. Foreclosure effects of new 
long-term priority rights on existing capacity, which would not be directly linked to new investment in 
that infrastructure, indeed cannot be counter-balanced by arguments related to the need for investment. 
The same applies to the prolongation of historical contracts beyond their originally foreseen end date 
when this possibility is foreseen in the historic transport contract.
 17  
A first indication on how European Courts assess long-term priority access rights to 
interconnectors was given by the ECJ in its ruling on grandfathering rights on Dutch interconnectors 
in the VEMW case of 7 June 2005.
18 This case was referred to the ECJ under former Art 234 EC (new 
                                                      
11  ERGEG, Regulation (EC) 1228/2003 Compliance Monitoring, Second Report, Ref: E08-ENM-03-05 (2008). 
12  Role of Interconnectors in the Electricity Market. A Competition Perspective: MEMO/01/76 of 13.3.2001. 
13  UK/France Electricity Interconnector: IP/01/341 of 12.3.2001. In this case, the French and British TSOs, which were 
dominant on the transmission market between France and the UK, owned the submarine interconnector and had allocated 
100% of the capacity to EDF. 
14  European Commission press release IP/01/30 of 11.01.2001. Statskraft, E.ON and Elsam together had long-term priority 
access rights for 100% of the Skagerrak cable and 34% of the Danish/German interconnector for 20/25 years. 
15 Case  COMP/M.1673  VEBA/VIAG, O.J. 10.7.2001, L 188/1. 
16  H. NYSSENS and D. SCHNICHELS, ‘Energy’, in J. FAULL and A. NIKPAY, The EC law of Competition (OUP, 2007). 
17  However, the Commission recognised the legitimate need for long-term capacity reservations where there was a clear 
linkage with a substantial new investment. Comp/E-3/37.921 – Viking Cable, O.J. 5.9.2001, C 247/11-12. Today, this 
situation would be covered through a merchant exemption under the sector-specific regulatory framework. 
18  For a full analysis of this judgment, see P. CAMERON, Competition in Energy Markets (OUP, 2007); L. HANCHER, 
‘Case C-17/03, VEMP, APX en Eneco N.v.v. DTE, Judgment of the Full Court of 7 June 2005’, 43(4) Common Market 
Law Review (2006), p. 1125-1144 and K. TALUS, ‘First Interpretation of Energy Market Directives by European Court 
of Justice – Case C-17/03 Vereniging voor Energie’, 24 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2006), p. 266-
281. Adrien de Hauteclocque and Kim Talus 
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Art 267 TFEU) by the Dutch Administrative Court for Trade and Industry which had to rule on the 
legality of the long-term priority access rights of the former incumbent SEP (today NEA) on Dutch 
interconnectors. These long-term priority access rights were justified in the pre-liberalization period 
by the underlying long-term power purchase agreements with foreign producers. SEP had to ensure 
cheap and reliable electricity supply in the Netherlands and these contracts were thought to help it 
fulfil these public service obligations, thereby justifying the grant of an import monopoly. Following 
the first liberalization directive, the import monopoly of SEP was abolished and the electricity sector 
was partially unbundled. The transmission subsidiary, TenneT, was vested with network assets 
including the interconnectors on the German and Belgian borders. Following the transposition of the 
first liberalization directive in national law, the national regulator, DTE, enacted the Network Code 
which allocated long-term priority access rights to SEP on the international interconnectors, first for 
50% and then 25% of the full capacity of these interconnectors until 2009, so that the company could 
fulfil its long-term purchase obligations. Three competitors of SEP, grouped in the professional 
association VEMW, decided to challenge these remaining long-term priority access rights on the basis 
of former Art 28, 81, 82 and 86 EC (new Art 34, 101, 102 and 106 TFEU), and Art 7(5) of the first 
liberalization directive.
19  
In the course of the proceeding, the Commission,
20 the Dutch state and the Advocate General Stix-
Hackl all considered that these arrangements complied with EU law. Their arguments generally 
revolved around the general community law principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations, 
in addition to the fact that SEP was truly vested with public service obligations at the time of 
contracting. The Dutch government similarly pointed out that these arrangements could also be 
considered non-discriminatory on the basis of Art 3(3) of the first liberalization Directive. The ECJ 
however dismissed this argument as Art 3(3) does not provide for derogations of Art 7(5) and 16. We 
cannot but notice here that a combined reading of the different articles of the first directive yields 
ambiguous results on this issue as Art 7(5) and 17(5) could be considered contradictory.  
The solution adopted by the ECJ was to avoid considering the application of former Art 86(2) but 
rather to refer to Art 24 of the first liberalization Directive which gave the opportunity to Member 
States to apply for a transitional regime when liberalization resulted in some commitments of the 
former incumbents becoming impossible to fulfil. The Netherlands had not applied for derogation and 
the Court judged that unilaterally disregarding some provisions of the first liberalization Directive 
could amount to protecting the former incumbents and impairing competition.  
This judgment has been very influential on both national and community levels. Several national 
regulatory and antitrust authorities have indeed started to assess priority rights in the light of this 
judgment. A year after the judgment the Commission also published a staff working paper
21 
commenting on the decision. It went as far as arguing that in the light of VEMW any long-term priority 
access rights should be considered discriminatory in nature and thus non-compliant with the second 
liberalization Directive and Regulation 1228/2003 (analysed below), unless the Member states had 
previously applied for a transitional regime.
22 As we will see in the second part of this chapter, the 
VEMW case will have consequences reaching far beyond the electricity sector. 
                                                      
19  Art 7(5) states: “The system operator shall not discriminate between system users or classes of system users, particularly 
in favour of its subsidiaries or shareholders.” 
20  The European Commission had already taken this position in its XXXIIId Report on Competition Policy in 2003. 
21  Commission Staff Working Paper on the Decision C-17/03 of 7 June 2005 of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, SEC(2006) 547 of 2006. 
22  For a critical view of this Staff Working Paper, see K. TALUS and T. WÄLDE, ‘Electricity Interconnectors in EU Law: 
Energy Security, Long-term Infrastructure Contracts and Competition Law’, 32 European Law Review (2007), p. 125 – 
137. Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas Networks 
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C. The Contribution of Regulation 1228/2003 and the Congestion Management Guidelines 
This is in the context of the Florence process that ruled cross-border exchanges were incrementally 
negotiated between participants and subsequently made legally binding by the European Commission 
in the form of Regulation 1228/2003. Regulation 1228/2003 had a clear harmonization purpose, 
especially on cross-border tariff, as national tarification systems used too widely diverge, thereby 
creating trade distortions.
23 The guidelines were then introduced in 2006 under the comitology 
procedure to further clarify the requirements of the Regulation. The primary objective of Regulation 
1228/2003 was to clarify the rules of the game in three core areas: cross-border tarification and inter-
TSO compensation scheme, transparency and methods of cross-border capacity allocation.  
The core legal documents addressing CACM on interconnection today are Regulation 714/2009
24 
and the amended congestion management guidelines
25 (thereafter “the guidelines”). We note that the 
new Regulation 714/2009 which repeals Regulation 1228/2003
26 does not create any new substantive 
rules on CACM, except for a strengthened duty on TSOs to cooperate at the regional level (Art 12).
27 
These documents are important for market players who wish to trade across borders as they set the 
framework within which national TSOs and regulators are to manage the allocation of cross-border 
capacities in a context of scarcity. 
As physical capacities remain generally under-sized, an efficient allocation of existing capacities 
indeed becomes crucial. Even today congestion management methods in the European Union still tend 
to remain border specific and thus to differ across Member States, although harmonisation is slowly 
taking place. Congestion management methods are usually classified as market-based and non-market-
based. Non-market-based mechanisms are usually less transparent and more prone to discrimination. It 
is especially important to have non-discriminatory methods when most TSOs remain weakly 
unbundled and thus could favour their affiliated generation and supply arms. Most importantly, non-
market-based methods do not necessarily allocate the capacities to market operators who value them 
the highest. This is why they are not compatible with the regulations on cross-border exchanges. The 
two main non market-based methods are first come/first served and pro rata rationing. As its name 
indicates, a TSO which uses the first-come first-served method will allocate cross-border capacities 
following the date on which a request is received. When all the capacity is allocated, the application 
process stops. The usual criticism against this method is the potential for discrimination to the 
advantage of the parent company. In the case of a lack of adequate publicity and sufficient advance 
notice, and possible prior warnings informally sent to the parent company to ensure it applies on time, 
discrimination will occur and the capacity will not be allocated to the market player which necessarily 
values it the most. With the pro rata rationing method, all requests are accepted but capacities 
effectively granted ex post are limited according to a percentage relating to the over-subscription, the 
obvious problem here being strategic over-subscription. However, we note that a liquid and 
transparent secondary trading market would limit these shortcomings. 
Market-based methods compatible with Regulation 714/2009 are explicit and implicit auctions. 
With perfect foresight and no transaction costs, these methods yield the same results in terms of social 
welfare, at least in the short term.
28 Auctioning is non-discriminatory as long as the process is 
                                                      
23  Recital 11 of Regulation 1228/2003. 
24  Regulation 714/2009of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network 
for cross-border exchanges in electricity, O.J. L 211/15. 
25  As amended by Commission Decision 2006/770/EC, OJ L312/59. 
26  Regulation (EC) n° 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to 
the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, O.J. 15.7.2003, L 176/1. 
27  A duty which was already partly present in the guidelines (para. 3) 
28  L. DE VRIES, ‘Securing the Public Interest in Electricity Generation Markets: The Myths of the Invisible Hand and the 
Copper Plate’, PhD Thesis (2004), Delft University of Technology. Adrien de Hauteclocque and Kim Talus 
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monitored fairly by the national regulator. The congestion rent perceived by the TSO has then to be 
used for decreasing the transmission tariff, guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated 
capacity or reinvesting in the infrastructure.
29 Coordinated auctions for year-, month- and day-ahead 
capacities had to be implemented by 1 January 2007 within the seven regions defined by the 
guidelines.
30 The setting up of regions was primarily intended to facilitate an incremental 
harmonization of information exchanges, capacity calculations and optimisation of allocation. The 2
nd 
ERGEG compliance report argued that the regional initiatives have been a key driver of improvements 
of compliance with the former Regulation 1228/2003 and guidelines.
31 
From an efficiency point of view, methods for auctioning are not equal. Explicit auctions make 
market players bid for sell/purchase of energy and only then for transport capacity. There is thus a 
time lag between capacity allocation and wholesale market clearance, which increases transaction 
costs and uncertainty.
32 Along with the requested capacity amount, applicants have to declare how 
much they are willing to pay for this capacity. These bids are ordered by price and allocated starting 
from the highest one until the available capacity is all used up. Usually the price is set to the bid price 
of the lowest allocated bid. The Sector Inquiry reported that on several borders (e.g. 
Netherlands/Germany and UK/France) capacity was nominated from the high price area towards the 
low price area, which is counter-intuitive. These arbitrage mistakes are likely due to the fact that 
capacity allocation ends before power exchange clearance, except in the case of market power abuse. 
Another concern with explicit auctions is the illiquidity of infra-day markets which do not allow for 
easy resale of electricity when price differentials reverse at gate closure.  
Another solution complying with Regulation 714/2009 is implicit auctioning.
33 In implicit 
auctioning, the spot market as we saw is separated from the transmission capacity allocation procedure 
and closes after the transmission capacity has been allocated. In this system however, the allocation of 
cross-border capacities is managed by neighbouring power exchanges. Market players wishing to 
import or export directly place bids in the organized wholesale market and the market clearing 
procedure determines the most efficient amount and direction of physical power exchanges between 
the two markets. The management of capacities and wholesale energy bids is thus simultaneous.
34 This 
de facto cancels all the arbitrage possibilities and transaction costs for market players by re-integrating 
transport and production/consumption decisions for cross-border trade. Implicit auctions are thus the 
most economically efficient capacity allocation mechanism but explicit auctions are usually easier to 
implement as they are already widely used in the European Union. Implicit auctions would also allow 
for an easier coordination of capacity allocation for trade across several borders. Such a multilateral 
mechanism would nevertheless require coordination between national TSOs and preferably a single 
regulator for the whole area. In addition to better congestion management methods, Art 5 imposes 
transparency requirements on TSOs. Transparent methods for the calculation of available transfer 
capacities and the transmission reliability margin for each day must be approved by the national 
regulator. These calculations must be made public on a timely basis, particularly before the day of 
                                                      
29  Art 16 and para. 6 of the guidelines. 
30  According to the Commission’s Communication on the application of the Regulation 1228/2003, this deadline could not 
be respected due to technical difficulties. 
31  ERGEG, Regulation (EC) 1228/2003 Compliance Monitoring, Second Report, Ref: E08-ENM-03-05 (2008). 
32  K. NEUHOFF, ‘Integrating Transmission and Energy Markets Mitigates Market Power’, CMI Working Paper 17 (2003), 
University of Cambridge. 
33  In fact, implicit and explicit auctioning are now the only acceptable congestion management solutions (para. 2.1 of the 
guidelines).  
34  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into the details of the implementation of implicit auctions. In the literature, the 
implementation of implicit auctions in the Nordic market is generally referred to as ‘market splitting’. The expression 
‘market coupling’ is generally used for the mechanisms developed by ETSO and the association of European Power 
Exchanges (EuroPex) at the French/Dutch/Belgian borders. In theory, ‘market splitting’ and ‘market coupling’ should 
yield similar results in terms of social welfare. Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas Networks 
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transport and must include week-ahead and month-ahead estimates with quantitative indicators on the 
reliability of such estimates. TSOs also have a duty to net commercial flows where feasible to 
maximise the use of the interconnector.  
Even though the Regulations on cross-border exchanges and the guidelines can be considered as 
important steps forward, key parts of market design for CACM remained unaddressed, especially in 
view of the development of the market coupling initiatives involving power exchanges. We will now 
see to what extent the new draft framework guidelines fill these regulatory gaps.  
D. The Project of Draft Framework Guidelines on CACM 
As said above, the Third Package does not itself improve the market design for CACM in electricity. 
However, it brings innovation to the institutional side by creating an Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European Networks of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity and Gas (ENTSOE and ENTSOG) with a mandate to develop FG and network codes for 
the whole EU. ACER will have the obligation to submit to the Commission draft FG which set out 
clear and objective principles for the new network codes to be prepared by the ENTSOs (within 12 
months). The new draft framework guidelines on CACM for electricity were published on September 
2010. 
1. Towards a Comprehensive Compound of Framework Guidelines and Network Codes 
The idea of EU framework guidelines originated from ERGEG’s concern that TSOs might develop EU 
network codes that did not address the right issues. The Commission will define priorities for network 
codes and ACER will only act upon its request (within 6 months). If the Commission is dissatisfied 
with the work of ACER, it can require a review of the draft guidelines submitted. If ACER fails to 
proceed, or if the ENTSOs fail to complete the requested draft network codes, the Commission can 
take the lead each step of the way. We note that the Third Package does not provide a clear definition 
of what draft guidelines should include and that there are also no clear provisions as to the binding 
effect of network codes. The list of network areas covered by the Regulation 714/2009 is very 
extensive and no priorities are provided in the legislation.  
After satisfactory review of the content of network codes by ACER (within 3 months), the 
Commission may obtain approval via the 'regulatory procedure' (comitology). This also means that the 
Commission does not have to decide to make the EU network codes binding immediately, but the 
option is always there if TSOs are not fully complying. ACER will then monitor implementation of 
the codes and can eventually submit recommendations to the Commission, the European Parliament 
and the Council when it deems necessary. 
We note that the powers of the Commission to adopt general binding measures on technical and 
operational cross-border issues are extended considerably. Originally limited to congestion 
management principles, inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanisms and 
harmonization of principles underlying the setting of charges applied to producers and consumers, the 
Commission’s powers now extend to establishing cross-border network code areas and the 
certification of TSOs, as well as to require the provision of information, to determine the rules for the 
trading of electricity and lastly to determine details of investment incentive rules for interconnector 
capacity including locational signals. ACER will only have an advisory role here. The ENTSOs, 
however, can initiate the process of formulation of new network codes beyond the agenda set by the 
Commission (even though the process for review and adoption remains the same). Despite a proposed 
amendment by the European Parliament, ACER cannot enact binding guidelines for network codes. 
The procedure for adopting network codes is also complex and uncertain, which is why ERGEG and the gas and 
power TSOs’ EU trade bodies have started work on following the process foreseen in the Third Package for 
developing new EU framework guidelines, network codes and development plans as a test case, ahead of formal 
implementation.  Adrien de Hauteclocque and Kim Talus 
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2. The Project of Framework Guidelines on CACM of September 2010  
The draft framework guidelines aim to complement and clarify (without replacing) the existing 
congestion management guidelines attached to Regulation 714/2009. They try to address some of the 
missing parts in market design for CACM in electricity. We note that these guidelines do not address 
the relationship between balancing and intra-day markets which will be treated otherwise. The 
guidelines pursue four objectives: (i) improve cross-border capacity use and enhance coordination, (ii) 
improve market design for the cross-border day-ahead market, (iii) make forward markets more 
efficient and (iv) achieve more efficient intra-day market.  
The guidelines first aim to harmonize the methods used by TSOs for cross-border capacity 
calculation. The two methods to be used are Flow-Based (FB) and Available Transport Capacity 
(ATC). The FB method is a first best but raises serious technical (and institutional) feasibility 
problems, explaining why two options remain open. ENTSOE will have a duty to find a solution in 
case several capacity algorithms are used within the same control area and the capacity calculation 
method will have to be approved by national regulatory authorities (and made public).  
An interesting innovation is that TSOs will have to create a common grid model describing the 
transmission network including the location of generation units and demand. Bidding zones for day-
ahead, intra-day and long-term time frame will then have to be defined, and approved on a regional 
basis by the national regulatory authorities involved, according to efficiency criteria and not national 
borders. Several bidding zones are also possible in case structural congestions exist within one control 
area, when countertrade/redispatch is not the most efficient solution. The guidelines recall that 
curtailing interconnectors to alleviate internal congestion is usually not possible. In case no other 
solution was possible, it must be reported transparently to the national regulatory authorities.  
For the first time, a document addresses in a little depth the regulation of day-ahead capacity 
allocation, unfortunately in still very general terms. The guidelines foresee that TSOs and power 
exchanges will have to cooperate to implement price coupling. However, the guidelines remain short 
of guidance on the mechanism itself, e.g. on the product offered or maximum prices. Principles of 
transparency and regulatory review are restated.  
As regards forward markets, the guidelines foresee a system where financial or physical 
transmission rights would be equally acceptable for hedging purposes. Financial transmission rights 
between two given nodes in a power system with nodal pricing allow holders to receive the nodal 
price difference at these two nodes. Financial rights can thus be used as financial tools to hedge 
against locational price differences which in turn sets the value of financial rights. It is however 
complicated to see how financial rights could be used in Europe in the short term as national market 
designs are not harmonized enough and regulatory supervision over cross-border infrastructure is 
insufficient. Most liberalized power markets in the USA have been (or are about to be) able to 
implement financial rights. This for instance opens the possibility of a decentralised development of 
merchant investment being rewarded through the sale of the financial rights that new merchant 
investments create for the system as a whole. In the case physical transmission rights are used, a use-
it-or-lose-it (UIOLI) mechanism will be imposed for resale of non-nominated capacity. This is positive 
as it maximises the use of available capacity and prevents anti-competitive capacity withholding. The 
physical rights owner will receive the financial resale value from TSOs. The UIOLI mechanism 
however requires the existence of a transparent and anonymous secondary trading platform, which is 
also foreseen in the guidelines. 
As concerns intra-day capacity market, the fact that it helps manage intermittent generation is 
recognized. Implicit capacity trading is foreseen but as above matching processes and the definition of 
block bids is not investigated. Continuous trading is however likely to remain the capacity allocation 
method of choice in the foreseeable future, even though it can be combined with implicit auctioning. 
Firmness of intra-day capacity, regulatory monitoring, data transparency and non-discrimination 
between the different types of product will also have to be included in the network codes. TSOs will Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas Networks 
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have the duty to use suitable matching methodologies and capacity algorithms between the different 
products and timeframes.  
Lastly, the guidelines last address several more general issues to complement the congestion 
management guidelines. It states that the 10-year network development plan will have to clarify where 
the congestions are and what the possible solutions are to implement. As concerns 
redispatching/countertrade, TSOs must coordinate at the regional level and make sure that congestion 
costs are fairly allocated by bidding zones or control areas. The guidelines also foresee adequate 
oversight of power exchanges when they organize market coupling, in particular to ensure non-
discrimination between market participants or products. As a general principle, the guidelines 
emphasize the importance of firmness of capacities and compensation of capacity owners when they 
have been curtailed.  
E. Conclusion on Electricity 
Overall, from the early days of liberalization up until the new framework guidelines on CACM, the 
EU has been trying to find a suitable and harmonized market design for interconnection. The draft 
framework guidelines clearly constitute an additional step in the right direction and show that the 
institutional architecture created by the Third Package is able to deliver concrete solutions in the most 
technical areas. However, it can be noted that several weaknesses will still have to be remedied sooner 
or later, in particular the issue of the duration of capacity rights and the regulation of power 
exchanges.  
With the development of market coupling, we see the end of a long-term trend towards the 
implementation of a market design with ever shorter duration for cross-border capacities. However, 
market players also need longer duration, and not only up to 3 years.
35 Freeing interconnectors from 
grandfathering rights made sense and, as we saw, brought consensus. But due to the enduring problem 
of the low physical capacity of interconnectors, a policy trade-off certainly exists between re-
allocating capacities on a short-term basis to allow access to more competitors in the short term and 
reallocate at least part of the capacity on a long-term basis to benefit from the long-term efficiency 
advantages of cross-border long-term supply contracts (investment and longer-term entry). More 
precise guidelines on these issues would be welcome. 
The regulatory framework for power exchanges and market coupling initiatives also still remains 
much of a problem. Power exchanges are now key actors in the process of single market integration. 
By implementing market coupling and merging across borders, they contribute to price convergence 
and increased liquidity. However, it remains to be seen whether their incentives are, as they claim, 
truly aligned with the market integration project. As concerns market coupling, we note that the 
guidelines barely touch on algorithms, block definitions and matching processes, where inefficiencies 
can easily emerge. In addition, the guidelines as they stand do not provide any path towards 
harmonization at the EU level. The relationship between TSOs and power exchanges also remains 
unaddressed, save the existence of a general obligation to cooperate. Lastly, the competences of 
national regulators on power exchanges have not been clarified. By stating a general right of 
regulatory oversight, they merely restate what already exists in the directive and do not address the 
current regulatory gaps. In the years to come, the regulation of power exchanges and market coupling 
at EU level are likely to become major issues.  
                                                      
35 See the interesting discussion in ERGEG, Draft Benchmarking Report on Medium and Long-term Electricity 
Transmission Capacity Allocation Rules, E09-ERI-23-03, 26 February 2010.  Adrien de Hauteclocque and Kim Talus 
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2. Third-party Access in Natural Gas Markets: Competition Law and Sector Specific 
Regulation 
If the main access issues in EU electricity markets relate to access to cross-border capacity and the 
related congestion management, the issues in natural gas markets are access to transit and import 
capacity. The problem was widely documented in the 2005 – 2007 Sector Inquiry where the 




38 This difference in electricity and gas is connected with the differences in 
the market organisation, which in turn relates to the differences in electricity and gas. Where 
electricity is generated at multiple locations across the EU and the markets have historically been 
restricted to the national borders of each Member State, natural gas production is restricted by 
geological factors to certain areas, most of which are located beyond the borders of the EU.
39 As such, 
natural gas has to be transported from the production to the consumption areas. The natural gas 
network is therefore by necessity more “international” than electricity networks are. This type of 
market organisation requires that the potential market entrant can access both transit and import 
capacities to bring the natural gas from the delivery point to the consumption area. It is no surprise that 
the recent Commission competition law enforcement on access issues has focused on these areas.  
A Competition Law and Third Party Access 
As was noted above, the main access issues in the electricity sector relate to the cross-border 
interconnector capacity. Prior to the ECJ judgement in case C-17/03, VEMW and others
40, the 
capacity in many of the interconnectors was reserved through long-term capacity reservations which 
where based on the pre-liberalisation legacy contracts. The continuing validity of these capacity 
contracts was recognised by the Commission. The judgement of the ECJ underlined the need to ensure 
TPA and suggested that many of the existing capacity reservations would be discriminatory and 
prohibited. The judgement had far reaching effects in the electricity markets and access conditions 
improved.
41 The approach of the Commission changed radically after the judgement, resulting even in 
a suggestion that “[i]n substance and spirit, the Court ruling is therefore applicable to the grant of 
preferential transmission and distribution capacities of natural gas.”
42 While it would seem that the 
                                                      
36  The DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry (SEC(2006)1724) 10 January 2007, p. 60. 
37  Ibid., p. 66. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the access issues relating to storage. We note that the 
development in this respect has been slower than in case of TPA to pipelines. 
38  Ibid., p. 45 et seq. The same issue was also raised in many of the competition inquiries such as GDF Suez, E.ON or ENI. 
These cases will be examined below. 
39  Despite the recent changes in the natural gas markets, EU 27 is a net importer of natural gas, increasingly dependent on a 
very few producing countries. While some EU Member States, the UK and the Netherlands in particular, possess natural 
gas resources and others have potential for developing non-conventional natural gas resources, the bulk of natural gas for 
the EU comes from three sources: Russia (42 percent), Norway (24 percent), Algeria (18 per cent). (Commission Staff 
Working Document accompanying the Second Strategic Energy Review, Europe's Current and Future Energy Position 
Demand – Resources – Investments 13.11.2008 (COM/2008/781 final), p. 9.) However, when looking at these figures, it 
must be noted that the indigenous production in the EU represents 36 percent of the total supplies and together with 
Norwegian supplies the figure is 55 percent. Even with the potential emergence of shale gas, the more general picture is 
unlikely to change dramatically (Eurogas, Long Term Outlook for Gas Demand and Supply 2007-2030. Available at 
www.eurogas.org). 
40  Case C-17/03, VEMW and others, [2005] ECR I-4983. 
41  For just one example, see Z. BROCKA BALBI and M. BARRA, "Italian Rules on Interconnection Capacity Allocation - 
Before and After the "VEMW" Case" 1 OGEL (2007), www.ogel.org. 
42  Commission staff working paper on decision C-17/03 of 7 June 2005 of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (SEC/2006/547), 26 April 2006.  Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas Networks 
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judgement is not directly applicable to the natural gas sector
43, the recent competition law practice 
seems to have effectively extended the rationale of the C-17/03 to the natural gas sector. The outcome 
in these cases has been the release of a substantial proportion of the capacity in various pipelines. 
Examples of this extension are the recent decisions in GDF Suez
44 and E.ON.
45 These cases will now 
be briefly examined.  
1. The Cases  
In GDF Suez, the Commission initiated proceedings after finding that certain measures of GDF Suez 
might prevent or reduce competition in downstream supply markets for natural gas in France: ‘in 
particular, a combination of long-term reservation of transport capacity and a network of import 
agreements, as well as through under-investment in import infrastructure capacity.’
46 
To address these concerns, GDF Suez proposed to immediately release a large share 
(approximately 10%, corresponding to around 7 bcm per year
47) of its long-term reservations of gas 
import capacity into France, both for LNG re-gasification terminals and pipelines, in favour of third 
parties
48 and to continue to reduce its share of these reservations to below 50% in 2014 calculated 
from the total long-term capacity reservations for each year. There will also be a supervisory scheme 
in place to ensure that the long-term capacity has effectively been released and that this capacity has 
been offered to third parties.
49  
The commitments do not prevent GDF Suez from booking interruptible and short-term capacity. 
Similarly, in the event of insufficient demand for the capacity, the dominant or established companies, 
as the case may be, can only book capacity on a short-term basis. If the wording of Regulation 
715/2009
50 is followed, this means capacity reservations for less than one year are allowed for GDF 
Suez.  
The E.ON case follows the same rationale: significant reduction of its firm long-term capacity 
reservations in the German pipeline system.
51 The proposal of E.ON was offered in response to 
concerns that certain E.ON practices may have constituted a breach of EU rules on abuse of a 
                                                      
43  While the Commission recognises that there are significant differences in the natural gas and electricity market 
regulation, the Commission fails to explain what the effect of these differences is. Similarly, it fails to recognise some of 
the most central and relevant differences. First, the First Gas Market Directive did not contain a provision similar to 
Article 24 of the First Electricity Market Directive. Secondly, the directive recognises that long-term commodity 
contracts may require availability of long-term capacity. Finally, Article 32(1) of Directive 55/2003/EC does recognise 
the continuing validity of certain pre-liberalisation capacity contracts. (L. HANCHER, ”Case C-17/03, VEMP, APX en 
Eneco N.v. v. DTE, Judgment of the Full Court of 7 June 2005”, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, p. 1144). 
44  Case COMP/B-1/39.316 — Gaz de France (gas market foreclosure). 
45  Commission press release, “Antitrust: Commission welcomes E.ON proposals to increase competition in German gas 
market” (MEMO/09/567), 17 December 2009. 
46  Commission press release, “Antitrust: Commission opens formal proceedings against Gaz de France concerning 
suspected gas supply restrictions”, (MEMO/08/328), 22 May 2008. 
47  Commission press release, “Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by GDF Suez to boost competition in French 
gas market – frequently asked questions”, (MEMO/09/536), 3 December 2009. 
48  With certain restrictions on, for example, the potential buyers profile in terms of demand, payment guarantees to be 
provided and availability or likely availability of specified natural gas volumes. 
49  COMP/39.316 - GDF foreclosure. Proposed commitments available at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/39316/proposed_commitments.pdf. 
50  Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to 
the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005, OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 36-54. 
51  COMP/39.317 - E.On gas foreclosure. Commission press release, ”Antitrust: Commission welcomes E.ON proposals to 
increase competition in German gas market” (MEMO/09/567), 17 December 2009.  Adrien de Hauteclocque and Kim Talus 
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dominant position. The concern in this case was that E.ON may have closed off competitors from the 
market by booking almost the entire capacity at key entry points into the gas network on a long-term 
basis.  
On 4 May 2010, the Commission adopted a decision that rendered the commitments offered by 
E.ON legally binding. According to the decision, E.ON would reduce its firm bookings in the entry 
points of its German gas network to approximately 15 per cent by October 2010 and further to 50 per 
cent in the high-caloric gas market area and in E.ON’s grid for low-caloric gas to 64 per cent of the 
pipeline capacity. Like in GDF Suez, the decision does not prevent E.ON from booking short-term or 
interruptible capacity. The next sections will now examine and contextualize these capacity related 
decisions. 
2. The Analysis 
GDF Suez and E.ON are among the few recent competition law cases driven by the Commission to 




54 inquiries where the end-result was divestiture of certain network assets. The 
difference to these cases, ENI and RWE for example, is that the GDF Suez and E.ON cases focus on 
these two companies as shippers, not as TSO’s. Where the commitments in the TSO-related cases aim 
at eliminating the incentive to discriminate and the correction of market distortion in the long-run, the 
GDF Suez and E.ON commitments result in an immediate and long-term release of capacity
55, which 
will, given the duration of the commitments and the developments in the sector specific regulation 
(examine below), if properly overseen, also result in a permanent structural change in the markets.  
In addition to continuing the access related case law, the present cases also follow the rationale of 
the earlier Distrigaz
56 decision where the Commission imposed certain percentages as thresholds 
between activity that is considered anticompetitive and activity which is allowed. In Distrigaz, the 
thresholds were defined in percentages calculated from different supply volumes.
57 In GDF Suez and 
E.ON, the threshold of 50 percent of the total capacity represents, according to the Commission, a 
workable balance between the rights of companies and the need to create competitive conditions, i.e. 
capacity to compete.
58 While the fifty-fifty split of the capacity seems somewhat formulaic, the 
outcome in these two cases follows the same rationale that was adopted on the regulatory front in 
relation to the Nabucco pipeline. Here, the exemption decision under Article 22 of the Directive 
55/2003/EC imposes a capacity cap on the share of annual capacity which the shareholders, all 
dominant undertakings in their home-markets, can book at the total of all exit points.
59 As such, the 
regulatory exemption from TPA in the Nabucco case only covers half of the pipeline capacity.  
                                                      
52  COMP/39.315 – ENI..  
53  Cases COMP/39.388 – German Electricity Wholesale Market and COMP/39.389 — German Electricity Balancing 
Market. 
54  COMP/39.402 – RWE Gas Foreclosure. 
55  In ENI, the commitments include a pledge not to prolong or renew any transport contracts or to enter any new contracts 
as a shipper before the divestiture, except through market-based or public methods and only for reverse flow capacity 
towards other directions than Italy. The rationale being that any prolongation, etc. would effectively circumvent the 
rationale of the divestiture.  
56  COMP/B.1/37.966 – Distrigaz (15.1.2008).  
57 For details, see A. DE HAUTECLOCQUE, “EC Antitrust Enforcement in the Aftermath of the Energy Sector Inquiry: A 
Focus on Long-term Supply Contracts in Electricity and Gas”, in Delvaux B., Hunt M. & Talus K. (eds.), EU Energy 
Law and Policy Issues (Brussels: Euroconfidentiel 2008). 
58  Commission press release, ”Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by GDF Suez to boost competition in French 
gas market”, (IP/09/1872, 3 December 2009). 
59  Commission exemption decision in Nabucco (CAB D/2008/142), 8 February 2008). Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas Networks 
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Both E.ON and GDF Suez raise several interesting and highly complicated issues. First, whilst they 
do not directly address the questions relating to pre-liberalisation contracts, they highlight the 
difficulties in balancing legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectation and other related legal 
principles and the need to develop functional natural gas markets, including natural gas transportation 
capacity markets. The voluntary nature of the commitments of the discussed cases effectively 
circumvented these difficult questions.
60 Second, by favouring the short-term capacity contracting, 
these cases raise the issue of direction. Are we moving from the traditional long-term nature of the 
natural gas business towards a model marked by an increasingly short-term rationale? The third issue 
raised by these contracts relates to natural gas commodity contracts. These three issues will be further 
examined both in the next sections relating to competition law enforcement and in the following 
sections relating to regulatory measures in TPA. 
3. Addressing Foreclosure in EU Natural Gas Markets: Capacity vs Commodity Contracts  
While the E.ON and GDF Suez cases primarily concern long-term capacity contracts, they are also 
closely linked to long-term commodity contracts. These cases have finally provided indications on 
how EU competition law will be applied to upstream commodity contracts that are used to import 
significant volumes of natural gas to the EU area. The Commission has for some time recognised that 
long-term contracts have an important role to play in European gas markets and should be left as an 
option for the suppliers as long as they comply with EU regulation and especially EU competition 
laws.
61 However, little light was shed on what was meant by ‘as long as they comply with EU 
competition law’. Clearly, the GDF Suez and E. ON cases indicate that the key question is the volumes 
covered by these contracts. The long-term nature per se is not a problem but, instead, the focal point of 
the competition law enforcement is the large volumes these contracts cover. In essence, the rationale 
of the approach of the Commission seems to be that (i) long-term contracts have a foreclosing effect, 
(ii) this is true for both the long-term upstream commodity contracts and the long-term capacity 
reservation contracts and (iii) this foreclosure effect can be addressed in two ways: by attacking the 
supply foreclosure created by the upstream commodity contracts or by attacking the infrastructure 
foreclosure created by the capacity contracts. The capacity-related case law now suggests that the 
Commission has decided to adopt the second approach. No doubt this choice is closely related to the 
complicated nature of long-term upstream commodity contracts signed between the producer and the 
EU purchaser. These contracts have significant legal, political and economic aspects.
62 In addition to 
questions like legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations and the complicated economic 
effects for both the EU markets and the external supplying markets, including the demand security to 
enable large scale investments on continuing bases, the (geo)political aspects of these contracts speak 
heavily in favour of allowing long-term contracting with the external suppliers. The possible move 
away from such contracts should be left for the markets to decide. As such, the solution to allow long-
term contracting with the upstream suppliers and instead focus on the infrastructure foreclosure is 
welcomed. However, just as with the commodity contracts, it is necessary to take a pragmatic 
                                                      
60  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25. However, even in the absence of a specific article to that 
effect, the Commission is obliged to respect the proportionality requirement as a general principle of EU law in these 
cases. 
61  This has been noted, for example, in the Second Gas Market Directive, preamble 25, Security of Gas Supply Directive, 
preambles 8 and 11, Communication from the Commission, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report) COM(2006) 851 final p. 10, the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament also recognises that despite many positive effects, long-term 
agreements also serve to foreclose markets; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament – Prospect for the internal gas and electricity market, (COM(2007) final), p. 16. 
62  See for example, K. TALUS, ‘Long-Term Upstream Natural Gas Contracts and EC Competition Law – Efficiencies 
under Article 81(3) and Objective Justifications under Article 82’ in EU energy law and policy issues (Brussels: 
Euroconfidentiel 2010). Adrien de Hauteclocque and Kim Talus 
16 
approach to long-term capacity contracts and recognise both the legal and the economic aspects of 
these contracts.  
4. Capacity Releases 
There are a number of questions that should be carefully considered when requiring significant 
capacity releases. In particular, it must be noted that there is a significant difference between an 
investment being made in accordance with market-based principles and that being made under state 
funding or state protection.
63 In the first situation, the investor assumes the full commercial risk 
associated with the investment and the commercial logic suggests that the company should be 
rewarded both for the investment and the risk. Where the investment does not carry a risk, because of 
state funding or special rights, the investor should not be rewarded as in the previous example. Where 
a company investment is undermined through forced access or a similar intervention by public 
authorities, the incentive of that company and others active in the same market to invest in new 
infrastructure is significantly reduced. The situation is very different concerning investments made 
under special or exclusive rights. However, it is of paramount importance to note that even in this 
situation, the interventionist policy may under certain circumstances have a negative effect on 
investment. Where the policies of the public authorities are not transparent and where they do not 
seem to follow a clear and predictable logic, the uncertainty that follows might reduce the incentive to 
invest. The uncertainty about future policies may, at least in the short term, reduce the willingness of 
the market players to make significant up-front investments. Acting in a transparent, coherent and 
predictable way is essential to avoid this. This may be achieved through specific guidance by public 
authorities or through case law. It is submitted that in a situation of significant policy change, “from 
state to market” or the like, there is a particular need for guidance and the approach of the Commission 
of working through exemplatory cases, is only the second best option for guidance. A clear statement 
of future policy would provide best for the legal certainty that the market players need in this situation. 
Here, the approach of the Commission in the context of case C-17/03, VEMW and others
64 can be 
criticised. While the previous case law and the Commission had supported the continuing validity of 
the pre-liberalisation capacity contracts, because of considerations like legal certainty, and while to the 
Commission, congruently with its case law, supported the validity in the proceedings, it made a 
significant change of policy further to this judgment, this change of policy was to a certain extent 
called for. While the approach of the ECJ was indeed much narrower and more negative than the 
previous case law of the Commission, the judgment did not require a significant change of direction as 
the Commission interpretation of the judgment shows. It is especially damaging that the Commission 
chose to mask this change of direction under a very liberal and expanding interpretation of the 
judgment.  
B. Sector Specific Regulation and TPA to Natural Gas Pipelines 
Much like what was examined in the context of the sector-specific electricity market regulation, the 
development of the sector specific regulation for natural gas from Directive 30/1998
65 to the second 
and now third energy law packages has been remarkable. The first natural gas directive reflected the 
limits of the political possibilities of the time and with options on regulated and negotiated TPA 
should be considered only as the first step towards a more market oriented regulatory model. The 
                                                      
63  Similarly, M. MOTTA, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2005), p. 68. 
64  Case C-17/03, VEMW and others, [2005] ECR I-4983.  
65  Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas OJ L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 1-12. Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas Networks 
17 
second energy market package with Directive 55/2003
66 and Regulation 1775/2005/EC
67 took a 
significant step towards a regulatory system that can accommodate the emergence of a further degree 
of competition. It pushed the progress in all the key areas of the natural gas market regulation 
including level of unbundling, regulatory supervision and TPA. However, contrary to the initial 
expectations, that regulatory body failed to create competitive natural gas markets in the EU. This 
failure was documented in the Sector Inquiry and has thereafter been widely debated.
68 The latest step 
along the way to competitive markets is the third legislative package, together with the previously 
discussed competition related case law. We note that the new regulatory framework extends the 
application of the TPA rules to new areas and pushes the obligations of the TSO to a new level by, for 
example, highlighting the investments and the need to ensure long-term viability of the system. 
Clearly, the visible trend throughout this development from first to second and third packages is a 
move towards a more comprehensive regulation of TPA and more towards shorter term capacity 
reservations. This will be illustrated in the below discussion. This section will now examine these 
recent developments of the TPA regimes under EU energy regulation. In general terms, the TPA in the 
sector specific regulation relating to EU natural gas markets is developed through three levels of 
regulation with very different levels of detail. The general framework is established in the third natural 
gas market Directive 73/2009/EC
69 which, as will be examined below, establishes the basic rules and 
principles of TPA. The content of these rules and principles are then further specified in Regulation 
715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. This regulation focuses on 
the access issues and complements the more general natural gas market directive. However, the third 
and most detailed level of regulation are the network codes and guidelines that can be adopted on the 
basis of Regulation 715/2009. As the “devil often lies in the details”, the focus of this regulatory 
section will be on the development of this third level of regulation and the current developments with 
TPA related guidelines.  
As mentioned above, the general framework and minimum requirements to TPA in the natural gas 
sector are laid down in the Directive 73/2009/EC. At this general level, the access rules are not very 
different from those governing TPA to electricity networks. In the most simplified terms, the directive 
requires that the regulated TPA regime is based on published and pre-approved tariffs that are applied 
in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. In addition, there are provisions addressing many related 
issues such as balancing, details on publishing (though most elements are left for the national 
regulators to decide) and on fixing or approving the tariffs or the methodologies for their calculations 
(though again most details, including return on risk or investment incentives, are left for the national 
regulatory authorities), etc. The obligation under Article 13 of the directive to ensure that sufficient 
cross-border capacity is constructed also relates to the TPA.  
Access refusals follow the model of the second natural gas directive and access may be refused 
where there is (i) lack of capacity, (ii) public service obligation imposed by the Member States and 
(iii) on the basis of serious economic and financial difficulties with take-or-pay contracts. Access 
refusal must be reasoned and Member States may choose to ensure that the TSO/DSO makes the 
necessary enhancements to the system when it is economical to do so or when the customer is willing 
to pay for such enhancements in capacity or connection (Art 35). 
                                                      
66  Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ L 176 , 15.7.2003, p. 57-78. 
67  Regulation No. 1775/2005/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on conditions for 
access to the natural gas transmission networks, OJ L 289, 3.11.2005, p. 1-13.  
68  For example, see the 2008 - 2010 editions of EU energy law and policy issues and OGEL/OGELFORUM issues and 
discussions (www.ogel.org).  
69  Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the 
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Article 41 (6) of the Directive requires that the national regulatory authorities draft the procedures 
for the allocation of cross-border capacity and congestion management. However, in practise, the 
details of this requirement are largely left for the more detailed Regulation 715/2009, which, in Article 
13, includes a list of factors that the TSO and the national regulatory authority must consider. These 
include: cost-reflectivity or requirement of a market based system such as auctions (reflecting the 
market value instead of costs), need to provide investment incentives, mandatory use of separate entry-
exit point systems for network charges and the need for convergence of the national systems in the 
longer term. 
The basic requirement of Regulation 715/2009/EC is that the capacity allocation must facilitate 
new investments and be compatible with market mechanisms such as spot markets and trading hubs. 
While the regulation specifies that the TSOs should promote the development of energy exchanges, 
the coordinated allocation of cross-border capacity through non-discriminatory and marked based 
solutions, with special attention to implicit auctions for short-term allocation (Art 12(2)), does not 
provide much guidance on the practicalities of this cooperation. This is presumably left for the TSO’s 
to decide. In line with the need to promote developments of cross-border exchanges of natural gas and 
trading opportunities, the tariffs for entry and exit capacity must be set separately and, as in the more 
general provisions of Directive 73/2009/EC, must be cost-reflective or based on market value.
70 As in 
all parts of the energy acquis dealing with access issues, the requirements of non-discrimination and 
transparency accompany the more detailed provisions.
71  
According to Article 14, the TSO should offer (a) both firm and interruptible and (b) both short-
term and long-term TPA. According to Article 2 of Regulation 715/2009, long-term capacity means a 
capacity right of one year or more and short-term capacity means less than one year. According to the 
guidelines annexed to the regulation, TPA should be offered down to a minimum of one day. 
In the event of contractual congestion the regulation makes a clear distinction between situations of 
unused and fully used capacity. This distinction is of relevance to the question of pre-liberalisation 
transit contracts. Where contractual congestion occurs, any unused capacity should, according to 
Article 16(3), be offered on a secondary market, at least on a day-ahead and interruptible basis. Where 
this capacity is released on interruptible basis, the primary capacity holder can recall the capacity if 
need be. 
However, where possible, at least a part of the unused capacity should be offered as firm capacity 
(para. 4 of the guidelines annexed to the regulation). According to the Commission staff working 
document,
72 this means that in the event that capacity is persistently left unused, a firm use-it-or-lose-it 
principle would advocate in favour of total loss of capacity. Here, capacity would first be temporarily 
taken away from the primary capacity holder and, in the event of continuous unused capacity, the 
capacity would be permanently lost. This is to reduce the possibilities of capacity hoarding. From an 
enforcement cost point of view, it is also logical to treat this type of structural surplus of capacity 
differently from occasionally unused capacity.  
                                                      
70  Article 13 and 16(2) of Regulation 715/2009/EC. The now explicit prohibition of point-to-point pricing plays in favor of 
new entrants as it eliminates the advantages to the incumbents caused by the “portfolio effect”. For this see, C. JONES 
(ed.),  EU Energy Law: Volume I: The Internal Energy Market: The Third Liberalisation Package (Brussels: 
Claeys&Casteels 2010), p. 326.  
71  Article 13 of Regulation 715/2009/EC.  
72  Commission staff working document on capacity allocation and congestion management for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks regulated under Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 on conditions for access to the natural 
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C. Future Developments: CAM Pilot Framework Guidelines 
As was examined in the first part of this paper, the third package introduced a mechanism based on the 
cooperation of the Commission, the ACER and the ENTSOs under which framework guidelines can 
be adopted. In the natural gas, these guidelines can cover issues such as network security, 
interoperability rules or CACM rules.  
In addition to the discussions and conclusions in the context of the Madrid forum, it was decided 
that the work in the area of guidelines would start with a framework guideline and network code on 
capacity allocation.
73 After a request from the Commission, ERGEG assumed the role of ACER and 
eventually published its Pilot Framework Guidelines for Capacity Allocation on European Gas 
Transmission Networks on 10 June 2010.
74  
While not legally binding, as opposed to network codes and guidelines which are legally binding, 
such framework guidelines may lead to legally binding rules. Also, they are intended to set out the 
principles for the development of an eventual network code by ENTSO-G. As such, these guidelines 
should be taken to reflect the direction of the regulation in the area that they relate to. The next section 
will now examine these framework guidelines.  
1. Access Rules and Congestion Management  
Following the approach of Regulation 715/2009/EC, the logical starting point for the guidelines is that 
capacity should be offered as firm long and short-term capacity and as interruptible capacity. The 
capacity should primarily be firm. However, all capacity that has not been allocated, all surrendered 
capacity and any unused capacity that has been released through UOLI mechanisms should be offered 
to the market participants in order to maximise the use of the capacity. Presumably these additional 
categories of offered capacity can be offered as interruptible capacity.  
The suggestion is that in the ratio between short-term and long-term capacity, at least 10 percent of 
the capacity would be offered as short-term capacity. The guidelines refer to the definitions under 
Article 2 of Regulation 715/2009 and as such, a short-term capacity may refer to anything up-to one 
year capacity contract. However, the guidelines also suggest that intra-day interruptible capacity 
should be made available. The lead time from the allocation to the use of the capacity will correlate 
with the duration of the capacity service.  
This approach closely follows the pre-existing practise. For example, under the access regime 
adopted in the Nabucco project, 10 percent of the transportation capacity is reserved for short-term 
transportation capacity. Only if this short-term capacity is not booked can it be converted and offered 
as long-term capacity. Conversely, if long-term capacity is not booked, it can be converted into short-
term capacity. Where capacity is released and made available to other market participants, it is offered 
as interruptible capacity on a short-term day-ahead basis.  
The guidelines also propose integrating cross-border services and bundling of services so that one 
single allocation mechanism and nomination can be used to acquire capacity at connected entry-exit 
systems. This would not apply to pre-existing capacity contracts. However, in order to move to a 
bundled model, the guidelines propose that the capacity that becomes available at either side of the 
interconnection point would not be allocated beyond the expiration date for the capacity allocation of 
the other side of the interconnection point.  
As for the capacity allocation mechanism, the suggestion is that firm capacity will be offered 
through online auctions. The guidelines require this for day-ahead auctions but also leave open the 
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possibility for intra-day capacity auctions. For these situations however it does not rule out the use of a 
first-come-first-served mechanism which can indeed be more effective in situations with very short 
lead-times.  
Other services, other than day-ahead services, can also be offered on a prorated basis in order to 
prevent distorted bidding behaviour. This is possible where the necessary regulatory controls and 
transparency requirements are in place. In a situation marked by lack of liquidity and sufficient 
competition, explicit auctions can be used for capacity hoarding. The first-come-first-served 
mechanism is generally prohibited and can only be used under certain conditions.  
2. Pre-existing Contracts and CAM 
One of the controversial aspects of the Guidelines is the approach to pre-existing capacity contracts. 
Here, the balance between sanctity of agreements and legal certainty meet the need to develop the 
market and the changing factual context of long-term contracts.  
The guidelines suggest that all capacity contracts and/or relevant clauses in various general terms 
and conditions be amended within six months from the implementation of the future network code. 
Regardless of the specificities of a given contract and whether the contract allows for modifications, 
all contracts are to be modified to correspond to the new network code. Similarly, no tacit extensions 
can be allowed.  
This approach has been opposed by the historic capacity holders, the incumbents. In addition to the 
opposition relating directly to the guidelines, the same issue, sanctity of contracts versus need to adapt 
the regulatory treatment to changing markets and changing policies, was already discussed in the 
context of the Sector Inquiry. Here the TSOs and special capacity holders suggested that the use-it-or-
lose-it principle does not apply to transit capacities covered by pre-liberalisation capacity contracts.
75 
Under the approach advocated by the current capacity holders, the so-called ‘ship-or-pay’ transport 
contracts allow the primary capacity holder to re-nominate typically until two hours before the 
relevant flow of gas will occur. Any unused capacity could therefore be released on the secondary 
market only with a very short notice and only on interruptible basis. This would not allow the potential 
users of the unused capacity very little, if any, time to secure the gas. 
It is important to note certain factors when assessing the question of pre-existing capacity contracts. 
First, in many cases the capacity agreement has emerged through self-contracting: the vertically 
integrated operator has concluded a transit agreement with itself.
76 This will have an impact when 
examining the weight of arguments based on the pacta sunt servanda principle or sanctity of contracts. 
Second, in practice, many of the pre-liberalisation agreements were extended just months before the 
new access regime was introduced.
77 The vital importance of TPA as the main rule and the need to 
adopt a strict interpretation of any derogation from TPA was underlined by the ECJ in both the C-
17/03, VEMW and others
78, and in the C-439/06, Citiworks.
79 This strict interpretation has affects on 
the application of Article 32(1) of Directive 55/2003/EC. Against this background it seems clear that 
the possible extensions of those contracts that might have initially been protected are no longer 
covered by the derogation under Article 32(1). It also limits the force of arguments based on sanctity 
of contracts. Finally, a distinction must be made to situations where specific conditions of capacity 
contracts are modified and where the entire contract is deemed unlawful.  
                                                      
75  Article 32(1) of Directive 55/2003/EC recognises the continuing validity of certain pre-liberalisation capacity contracts. 
This is one of the legal bases for the arguments in favour of non-application of TPA rules on pre-liberalisation contracts.  
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D. Conclusion on Natural Gas  
Looking at the developments over the last years, we note that significant progress has been made. The 
clear trend in the access regimes and capacity allocations is towards shorter and shorter capacity 
services. In a very short period we are moving from very long-term, 25 years and above, to very short-
term capacity services, interruptible intra-day capacity being suggested by the guidelines. While this 
move towards shorter term services is in many ways a welcomed move (as it allows for new 
competition to emerge) the rationale and the nature of the natural gas business should not be forgotten. 
Clearly, short-term capacity is necessary for competition and development of the markets. However, it 
is equally clear that long-term capacity is necessary for investments and security of supply. Here, there 
is a need to consider the long-term nature of the natural gas business. With the move towards shorter 
and shorter TPA services, the risk of assimilation of short-term trading and price arbitrage and long-
term investment based reservations is looming. Different transactions have a different economic 
rationale. Given that long-term commodity contracts continue to play a role in the EU natural gas 
supply, there is a need for long-term capacity contracts matching the commodity contracts. If this is 
accepted, long-term should be comparable to the economics of the commodity contract. One way of 
doing this is to allow the shippers to book consecutive multi-year capacity services.  
Conclusion 
The objectives of the TPA provisions of both electricity and natural gas regulations are very similar: to 
creating capacity to compete. The specific features and the development stage of these two 
commodities result however in slightly different routes towards this common goal. In electricity, the 
development of market coupling initiatives creates new regulatory challenges but price convergence is 
now in sight. In gas, the progress has been slower and efficiently functioning spot markets are yet to 
emerge. However, the rapid and fundamental changes to world LNG markets have caused a significant 
change in this respect and created favourable conditions for short-term trading. In addition to the 
significant increase of available volumes and decreases in LNG prices, there is also an important 
regulatory dimension to this development. The introduction of third party access along with ownership 
unbundling, driven by both regulatory changes and antitrust enforcement, has combined with 
elimination of destination clauses (and other historical elements of the market structure) to completely 
transform the regulatory context in which natural gas companies operate. These fundamental changes 
have had a significant impact on the markets and the spot trading in the EU natural gas markets have 
taken off. 
It is interesting to see how far access regimes in electricity and gas have actually converged despite 
stark differences in the markets’ organization. The sector-specific regulatory regime in the internal 
market directives organises a market design in both sectors based as much as possible on short-term 
capacity allocation with a liquid secondary trading platforms. Under competitive conditions with no 
distortions to the incentives of the capacity holder, the expectation is that the primary capacity holder 
resells all unused capacity on a secondary market to make a profit. This scenario should materialise 
where sufficient infrastructure is in place and the incentives of the capacity holder to make a profit 
from unused capacity are not distorted by other factors. Where this is not the case and where market 
structure allows the capacity holder to protect its market position through blocking entry or to make 
short term monopoly profits from higher commodity price, there is a risk that the primary capacity 
holder benefits more from hoarding capacity and blocking entry than releasing it. The imposition of 
UIOLI mechanisms and an increased focus on firmness of capacity in both sectors is certainly the way 
forward but implementation still is an issue. The right portfolio of capacity durations that are to be 
proposed by TSOs in both sectors also remains an open question. Long durations, way over three 
years, are needed to facilitate investment in both sectors but the optimal mix of short and longer-term 
contracts is likely to greatly differ.  
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